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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case:

This appeal concerns the Conclusions of Law reached by the magistrate court in its
November 20, 2007 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff's Motion to Divide
Omitted Asset, and subsequently thereto, the district court's September 10, 2008 Decision on
Appeal. (R., 00030-00042, and 00052-00066.)

B.

Course of Proceedings:

The course of proceedings began with the Judgment and Decree of Divorce entered on
September 22,2005. (R., 00019-00029.)
On March 24, 2006, Plaintiff, Debra A. Borley (hereinafter "Debra"), filed a Motion to
Divide Omitted Asset. (Augmented Record YA.R."], No. 1.)
On April 18, 2006, Defendant, Kevin D. Smith (hereinafter "Kevin"), filed an Answer to
Debra's Motion to Divide Omitted Asset. (R., 00004.)
The Court set a final hearing on Debra's Motion to Divide Omitted Asset for August 28,
2006. (R., 00030.)
On August 28, 2006, Debra renewed her request to vacate the trial based on the fact that
Kevin had failed to answer discovery that was pertinent to the conclusion of Debra's case. (R.,
00030.) After considering Debra's renewed request for a continuance based on Kevin's failure
to respond to discovery, the court vacated the trial and directed that Kevin respond to all
outstanding discovery. (R., 00030.)
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On September 8,2006, Kevin filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that there had been no
assets omitted and also that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear this case. (R., 00030)
On September 27, 2006, the court reset Debra's Motion to Divide Omitted Asset for trial
on April 27,2007. (R., 00030.)
On October 10, 2006, the date set for the hearing on Kevin's Motion to Dismiss, neither
party appeared, and therefore Kevin's Motion was deemed withdrawn. (R., 00030-00031.)
On March 27, 2007 (30 days prior to the trial date), Kevin filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment with a supporting brief and affidavit. (R., 0003 1.)
On April 16, 2007, Debra filed an objection and response to the Motion for Summary
Judgment, claiming that pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Kevin's Motion for
Summary Judgment could not he brought since it was less than 60 days prior to the trial date.
(R., 0003 1.)
Afrer convening a status conference with counsel for each party, the court determined
that Debra's objection to the timeliness of the Motion for Summary Judgment was proper. (R.,
0003 1.) Each party, however, informed the court that they would submit a set of stipulated facts
from which the court could decide on the appropriateness of Debra's Motion to Divide Omitted
Asset. (R., 0003 1.) Thereafter, the court decided that it would treat the case as one having been
submitted on cross motions for summary judgment. (R., 0003 1.)
Based on counsel's representations, the court vacated the hearing on Debra's Motion to
Divide Omitted Asset, which was set for April 27,2007. (R., 0003 1.)
On July 19,2007, the court entered a final briefing schedule which required the stipulated
set of facts be filed no later than August I , 2007. (R., 0003 1.) The court required each party to
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file simultaneous briefs on August 13, 2007, setting forth their respective positions regarding
Debra's Motion to Divide Omitted Asset, and required that any reply brief be submitted no later
than August 29,2007. (R., 0003 1 .)
In addition to the stipulated set of facts, the court indicated that it would consider the
affidavits of both parties, excerpts from depositions of both parties, and documents received
through discovery which were provided to Kevin through his employment with United Airlines
as a pilot, both during and after the marriage of the parties. (R., 00032.)
On August 1,2007, Plaintiffs and Defendant's Stipulated Facts were filed. (R., 0003 1.)
On August 13, 2007, Debra filed Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Divide Omitted Asset. (A.R., No. 17.)
On August 13,2007, Kevin filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment. (A.R., No. 12.)
On August 29, 2007, Debra filed Plaintiffs Short Reply to Defendant's Supplemental
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (A.R., No. 18.)
On October 10, 2007, the magistrate court entered its Memorandum Decision. (R.,
00030-00042.)
On November 20, 2007, the magistrate court entered its Order Granting in Part and
Denying in Part Plaintiffs Motion to Divide Omitted Asset. (R., 00043-00045.)
On or about November 28,2007, Kevin filed a Notice of Appeal to the district court. (R.,
00046-00048.)
On December 4, 2007, Kevin filed a Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit of Derek Pica
in the magistrate court. (A.R., Nos. 20, 21 .)
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On December 4, 2007, Debra filed a Memorandum of Costs and Attomey Fees in the
magistrate court. (A.R., No. 19.)
On December 7,2007, Kevin filed an Objection to Plaintiffs Memorandum for Attomey
Fees and Costs in the magistrate court. (A.R., No. 22.)
On December 13,2007, Debra filed an Objection to Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit
of Derek Pica in the magistrate court. (A.R., No. 23.)
On December 28, 2007, Debra filed a Notice of Cross Appeal to the district court. (R.,
00049-00051.)
On January 29, 2008, the parties filed a Stipulation for Extension of Time to File
Respondent's Brief in the district court. (R., 00007.)
On January 3,2008, Kevin filed Appellant's Brief in the district court. (A.R., No. 25.)
On January 3 1, 2008, the district court entered an Order Granting Extension of Time to
File Respondent's Brief. (R., 00007.)
On February 7,2008, Debra filed Cross-Appellant's Brief in the district court. (A.R., No.
28.)
On February 28, 2008, the court entered its Order Denying Attomey Fees in the
magistrate court. (A.R., No. 24.)
On February 28,2008, Kevin filed Cross Respondent's Brief in the district court. (A.R.,
No. 29.)
On February 29, 2008, Debra filed Respondent's Brief in the district court. (A.R., No.
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On March 21, 2008, Kevin filed Appellant's Reply Brief in the district court. (A.R., No.
27.)
On September 10, 2008, the district court filed its Decision on Appeal. (R., 0005200066.)
On October 8, 2008, Kevin filed a Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. (R.,
00067-00069.)
On October 29, 2008, Debra filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court.
(R., 00070-00072.)
On or about February 3, 2009, Kevin filed a Motion for Extension of Time in which to
file Appellant's Brief.
On February 4, 2009, the parties filed a joint Stipulation to Augment Record in the
Supreme Court. (A.R., 7 1).
On February 4, 2009, the Supreme Court filed its Order Granting Extension of Time
(CV).
On February 11, 2009, the Supreme Court filed its Order Granting Motion to Augment
and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule. (A.R., 7 1.)
On March 10,2009, Kevin filed Appellant's Brief.
On April 3,2009, Debra filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File RespondentICrossAppellant's Brief, and Affidavit of Matthew R. Bohn in Support of Motion for Extension of
Time to File RespondentICross-Appellant's Brief.
On April 7, 2009, this Court entered its Order Granting Extension of Time - Brief(s) on
Cross-Appeals.
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C.
1.

Sti~ulatedFacts:
Kevin and Debra were common law married on August 1, 1988 and ceremonially
married on or about June 4, 1994. (R., 0002 1,n 1.O1 and A.R., 10, p. 1,y 2.)

2.

Kevin began working as a pilot for United Airlines ("United") in October 1990.
(A.R., No. 10, p. 2,7 2.)

3.

On or about December 9,2002, United filed for bankruptcy protection. (A.R., No.

4.

As a result of United seeking bankruptcy protections, "[The] pilots agreed to
concessions including reduced pay, loss of work benefits, and loss of pensions in
the 2003 restructured agreement." (A.R., No. 10, p. 2,n 4.)

5.

In May of 2001, United stated that if the pilots' "A Plan" (Defined Benefit
Retirement Plan) was terminated, its pilots would be compensated as follows:
7.
Convertible Notes. In the event that the A Plan is
terminated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1341 or 3 1342 following
judicial approval of such termination, the Revised 2003 Pilot
Agreement and the Plan of Reorganization shall provide for
the issuance of $550 Million of UAL convertible notes as
described in Exhibit " D to this letter of agreement to a trust
or other entity designated by the Association. The terms of
the UAL convertible notes described in Exhibit '9"shall be
subject to mutually acceptable modifications to optimize
implementation for all parties from an accounting, securities
law and tax law perspective.

6.

The pilots' A Plan was terminated by the Bankruptcy Court effective December 30,
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7.

After termination of the A Plan on December 30, 2004, the Pension Benefit
Guarantee Corporation Insurance System replaced, in limited part, the pension
benefits the pilots had accrued under the A Plan through December 30, 2004.
(A.R., No. 10, p. 3,1[ 7.)

8.

On September 22, 2005, Debra and Kevin were divorced pursuant to a Judgment
and Decree of Divorce which, in pertinent part, set forth the following:
2.
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT:
The
Property Settlement Agreement dated September 15, 2005 is
approved by this court. The Property Settlement Agreement is
approved by this Court, but it is not merged nor incorporated into
this Judgment and Decree of Divorce. A copy of that Agreement is
attached hereto. The parties have provided all of the terms of the
said Agreement.
2.
TRANSFERS TO WIFE: The Husband hereby
agrees to, and by this Agreement he does hereby transfer,
assign and convey unto the Wife as her sole and separate
property, and does hereby forever waive any and all rights
in and to, the items more particularly described as follows:
2.01 Attached hereto and by this reference
incorporated herein, is a Property and Debt
Schedule (hereinafter referred to as PDS). Wife is
awarded the items under the column entitled "To
Wife" as indicated with a dollar amount or an "x".
2.02 Any other property in her possession or
under her control except those items specifically
being awarded to the Husband.
3.
TRANSFERS TO HUSBAND: The Wife hereby
agrees to, and by this Agreement she does hereby transfer,
assign and convey unto the Husband as his sole and
separate property, and does hereby forever waive any and
all rights in and to, the items of property more particularly
described as follows:
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3.01 Attached hereto and by this reference
incorporated herein, is a Property and Debt
Schedule (hereinafter referred to as PDS). Husband
is awarded the items under the column entitled "To
Husband" as indicated with a dollar amount or an
6'

9,

X.

3.02 Any other property in his possession or
under his control except those items specifically
being awarded to the Wife.
4.
DIVISION OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS.
Husband has been employed by United Airlines and has a
pension, either with united ~ k i n e s or
, now with Pension
Benefit Guarantee Association. Wife shall receive fifty
percent (50%) of the benefit accumulated by Husband
during the marriage to be set over to her pursuant to a In
order for a pilot to receive stock distributions/allocations,
said pilot must have been employed on May 1, 2003.
Qualified Domestic Relations Order.

10.
AGREEMENT TO BE MERGED: The parties
hereto agree that in the event a divorce is entered, the
original of this Agreement will be submitted to the court for
approval and the parties hereto will request that this
Agreement be merged and incorporated and made a part of
the Judgment and Decree of Divorce.
13.
SEPARATE PROPERTYRNCOME AFTER
SIGNING OF AGREEMENT: The parties hereto
stipulate and agree that from and after the date of the
signing of this Agreement, any and ail property or income
acquired or earned by either party hereto shall be the
separate property of the party who has acquired or earned it
and the other party shall have no claim thereon. The parties
agree that any income earned by either party after the date
of signing this Agreement shall be the separate property of
the party earning the income, and any income on separate
property shall be separate property from and after the date
of signing this agreement.
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MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS:

15.

***
15.04 Each of the parties hereto represents to the other
that they have made full disclosure of all community assets
and community liabilities of which they are aware.
(A.R., No. 10, p. 3-5,y 8.)
9.

Pursuant to the Revised 2003 Pilot Agreement, on or about February 9, 2006,
Kevin received

1,616 shares of United stock (known as the stock

allocationsldistributions referenced in paragraph 16 herein (hereafter "stock

allocations"), valued at approximately $27 per share. (A.R., No. 10, p. 5,7 9.)
10.

In addition to the stock allocations, Kevin also received convertible notes (know6
as the convertible note allocationsldistributions (hereafter "convertible notes") in
February of 2006 valued at $30,707.36 directly deposited into a Schwab IRA
account and received an additional $25,229.84 in convertible notes in March of
2007. These convertible notes represented United's attempt to compensate the
pilots for the loss of their A plan. (A.R., No. 10, p. 5,y 10.)

11.

Kevin received an additional 406 shares of stock as part of the stock allocations,
valued at approximately $27 per share. (A.R., No. 10, p. 5,T 11.)

12.

Kevin received additional stock distributions as part of the stock allocations, but is
unsure as to the number of shares, value, etc. (A.R., No. 10, p. 5,y 12.)

13.

On June 23, 2006, United represented that the convertible notes received by their
pilots represented consideration for the loss of their "A Plan." Pursuant to a
"question and answer" outline, United stated the following:

Question 1: I understand that eligible pilots will receive
cash proceeds from the ALPA convertible note sometime in
August 2006. Why am I receiving these proceeds?
Answer 1: As part of the Bankruptcy Exit
Agreement, [the pilots] negotiated the right to
receive $550M, face amount, in Senior Subordinated
Convertible Notes to be issued by UAL not later
than 100 days after exit from bankruptcy. The MEC
. . . adopted an allocation methodology under which
the Notes [would] be sold as soon as possible after
issuance and the net proceeds of the sale . . . applied
as a partial offset to the losses suffered by the pilots
as a result of termination of [their] A plan.

14.

In order for a pilot to be eligible to receive the stock allocations, said pilot must
have been employed on May 1, 2003. For the pilot to actually receive any of the
stock allocations, the pilot must have been employed by United Airlines on
February 1, 2006. (A.R., No. 10, p. 6,7 14.)

15.

The stock allocations that each eligible pilot received attempted to compensate the
pilots for the work rules, compensation, and work benefits that each pilot lost as a
result of restructuring their collective bargaining agreement, which is to run from
May 1,2003 through December 3 1,2009. (A.R., No. 10, p. 6,715.)

16.

In order for a pilot to receive the convertible notes, said pilot must have been
employed on February 1,2006, and have been a qualifted member of the "A Plan"
as of December 30,2004. (A.R., No. 10, p. 6,7 16.)

17.

In determining a pilot's share of the convertible notes, United took into account
each pilot's age, years left to retirement (which is reached at age 60) and seniority.
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United projected that the more seniority a pilot had, the greater the projection as to
the aircraft that helshe would be flying at retirement. A pilot projected to be flying
a 777 at the time of his retirement versus a pilot that would be 'flying an A320
would be entitled to a greater allocation of convertible notes assuming that the
pilots were of the same age. The one with greater seniority would be projected to
be flying a more advanced aircraft with higher pay. (A.R., No. 10, pp. 6-7,117.)
18.

Once a pilot received either the convertible notes, and/or the stock allocations, he
could immediately cease his employment without any obligation to return any of
the originating funds from the convertible notes andlor stock allocations. (A.R.,
No. 10, p. 7,T 18.)

19.

D.

Kevin remains employed by United as a pilot. (A.R., No. 10, p. 7 , 1 19.)
Additional Facts Available to the Magistrate Court:

The convertible notes and stock allocations were not included in the Property Settlement
Agreement by Debra because she forgot about them as she was "emotionally distraught" due to
Kevin's infidelity. (A.R., No. 10, p. 7 , 7 21, and A.R., No. 16, Exh. 5 (Deposition of Debra A.
Borley, taken February 9, 2007, p. 19, L1. 13-25, p. 20, L1. 1-2).) Kevin did not volunteer the
information concerning the convertible notes and stock allocations at the time the Property
Settlement Agreement was prepared, and Debra had forgotten about the information. (A.R., No.
10, p. 7 , 1 21, and A.R., No. 16, Exh. 5 (Deposition of Debra A. Borley, taken February 9,2007,
p. 19, L1. 13-25, p. 20, L1. 1-2).)
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
A.

Is Debra entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 35(a)(5), 40, 41 and paragraph
15.03 of the Property Settlement Agreement?

Yes, Debra should be awarded her attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Appellate
Rules 35(a)(5), 40 and 41, and paragraph 15.03 of the Property Settlement Agreement, attached
to the September 22,2005 Judgment and Decree of Divorce, which states the following:
15.03 If an action is instituted to enforce any of the terms of this
Agreement, then the losing party agrees to pay to the prevailing
&all costs and attorneys' fees incurred in that action.
(September 22, 2005, Judgment and Decree of Divorce, Property Settlement Agreement,
15.03.) (emphasis added).
In the instant matter, it is beyond question that Debra should be considered the prevailing
party and be awarded her attorney fees on this appeal. On November 20, 2007, the magistrate
court entered an order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs Motion to Divide an
Omitted Asset. In other words, Debra went from having no interest in the United settlement to
being awarded a significant interest therein. Clearly, she should be considered the prevailing
party pursuant to paragraph 15.03, cited above, as the prevailing party. Consequently, Debra
should be awarded all costs and attorney fees incurred in this appeal.
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111.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
"In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the
same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment."

Infanger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 44 P.3d 1100 (2002), citing Eagle Water Co., Inc. v.
Roundy Pole Fence Co., Inc., 134 Idaho 626,7 P.3d 1103 (2000).
As this Court is well aware, under Rule 56, I.R.C.P., summary judgment is appropriate
where the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. McColm-Traska v. Baker, 88 P.3d 767 (Idaho 2004), Gardner v.

Evans, 110 Idaho 925, 929, 719 P.2d 1185, 1188 (1986), Sewell v. Nielsen, Monroe, Inc., 109
Idaho 192, 706 P.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1985); Arnold v. Diet Center, Inc., 113 Idaho 58 1, 746 P.2d
1040 (Ct. App. 1987).
"The motion for summary judgment provides a more expeditious and effective procedure
for quickly terminating an action that does not appear to entitle the plaintiff to relief on its
substantive merits." Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535,538,835 P.2d 1346, 1349 (Ct.App 1992
Pertinent to this case, if an action will be tried before the Court without a jury, the judge
is

constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary

judgment. Rather, the judge is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from
uncontroverted evidentiary facts. (See, Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515,
650 P.2d 657 (1982); see also, Anderson v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 461, 732
P.2d 699 (Ct.App. 1987).
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Further, the Idaho Supreme Court has "repeatedly stated that when reviewing a decision
of the district court acting in its appellate capacity, this Court will review the record and the
magistrate court's decision independently of, but with due regard for, the district court's
decision." Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 (2008). Succinctly
stated:
[tlhe Supreme Court reviews the trial court's (magistrate) record to
determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to
support the magistrate court's findings of fact, and whether the
magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. If
those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow
therefrom, and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's
decision, we affirm the district court's decision as a matter of
procedure.

Id. at 672. 183 P.3d at 760.
In this case, the magistrate court and the district court considered and reviewed the
Stipulated Facts dated August 1, 2007; considered the affidavits of both parties, excerpts from
depositions of both parties, and documents received through discovery which were provided to
Kevin through his employment with United as a pilot, both during and after the parties'
mmiage. (R., 00030-00042, and R., 00052-00058.) After reviewing this information, the lower
courts held as follows:
1.

Magistrate Court: Determined that Debra's Motion to Divide an Omitted Asset,

as it pertained to the convertible notes, should be granted, and determined that Debra's Motion to
Divided an Omitted Asset, as it pertained to the stock allocations, should be denied. (R., 0004300045.)
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2.

District Court: Affirmed the magistrate court's opinion with respect to the

convertible notes, but ordered that the "accrued benefit method" be utilized as opposed to the
lower court's utilization of a modified "time rule method." (R., 00063-00064.) The district
court also held that the stock allocations constituted an omitted asset, and ordered that the
magistrate court should "determine what portion of the stock allocations were 'earned' before
September 22, 2005, the date of divorce, and then divide that portion between the parties as
equity requires." (R., 00064-00065.)
111.

ARGUMENT
1. Neither the Magistrate Court nor the District Court Erred When

It Determined that the Propertv Settlement Agreement Was
Merged into the Judgment and Decree of Divorce.
Contrary to Kevin's assertion, there is no clear and convincing evidence supporting the
non-merger of the Property Settlement Agreement. Paragraph 10 of the Property Settlement
Agreement specifically states that it is to be merged into the Judgment and Decree of Divorce.

(R., 00024,1 lo.) Each party executed this document before a notary public. (R., 00026-00027.)
By its terms, the Property Settlement Agreement reveals that the parties intended it to be merged
into the Judgment and Decree of Divorce.
In Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Idaho 384,462 P.2d 49 (1969), this Court noted that
When parties enter into an agreement of separation in
contemplation of divorce and thereafter the agreement is presented
to a District Court in which a divorce action is pending and the
court is requested to approve, ratify or confirm the agreement,
certain presumptions arise. In the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary, it will be presumed that each provision of
such an agreement is independent of all other provisions and that
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such agreement is not integrated; it will be further presumed that
the agreement is merged into the decree of divorce, is enforceable
as a part thereof and if necessary may be modified by the court in
the future.

Phillips, at 387,462 P.2d at 52.
Neither the magistrate court nor the district court was faced with clear and convincing
evidence overcoming the presumption of merger as set forth in Phillips. Again, the Property
Settlement Agreement executed by the parties before a notary public on September 15,2005 and
September 16,2005 respectively, confirms that it was to be "merged and incorporated and made
a part of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce." (R., 00024,n 10.)
Inexplicably, however, the September 22, 2005 Judgment and Decree of Divorce states
that although the Property Settlement Agreement "is approved by this Court, ... it is not merged
nor incorporated into this Judgment and Decree of Divorce." (R., 00019-00020.) Faced with this
contradiction of terms, the magistrate court and the district court reached the same conclusion:
there was no clear and convincing evidence to support the non-merger of the Property Settlement
Agreement.
Consequently, the magistrate court, along with the district court, correctly characterized
the ambiguity contained within the Judgment and Decree of Divorce and the Property Settlement
Agreement:
Smith argues that because the language in the Judgment and
Divorce Decree is unambiguous, the Court must exercise free
review over the magistrate court's decision. This argument is
misplaced. It is true that the language of the divorce decree when
taken alone is unambiguous, but in making his determination the
magistrate court considered both the agreement and the decree.
When these two documents are read together they are ambiguous
as to the parties' intent. Consequently, their interpretation is a
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question of fact and the Court must review the magistrate court's
findings only to determine whether they were based on substantial
and competent evidence. The Court finds his findings are based on
substantial competent evidence and, therefore, the Court upholds
his determination.
(R., 00060-00061 .)
The presumption set forth in Phillips controls. The lack of clear and convincing evidence
mandates that the Property Settlement Agreement was merged into the parties September 22,
2005 Judgment and Decree of Divorce. Based on the above, the lower courts did not err in
reaching the conclusion that the Property Settlement Agreement was merged in the September
22,2005 Judgment and Decree of Divorce.
2. Neither the Magistrate Court nor the District Court Modified the
Jud~mentand Decree of Divorce.

At the outset, it should be noted that contrary to Kevin's assertion, whether the Property
Settlement Agreement was merged into the September 22, 2005 Judgment and Decree of
Divorce is a non-issue in light of the relief originally sought by Debra. Again, Debra filed a
Motion To Divide Omitted Asset; she did not seek "modification" of the Judgment and Decree
of Divorce. (A.R., p. 1, No. 1.) The magistrate court clearly had the authority and jurisdiction to
grant Debra's Motion to Divide Omitted Asset. After all, an action for divorce is an action in
equity. See McHugh v. McHugh, 115 Idaho 198,200,766 P.2d 133, 135 (1988) (citing Rudd v.
Rudd, 105 Idaho 112,666 P.2d 639 (1983)).
"Further, equity having obtained jurisdiction of the subject matter of a dispute, will retain
it for the settlement of all controversies between the parties with respect thereto and will grant all
proper relief whether prayed for or not." Id. (citing Boesiger v. Freer, 85 Idaho 551, 563, 381
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P.2d 802, 809 (1963)) Citing Barnard & Son, Inc., v. Atkins, 109 Idaho 466,469,708 P.2d 871,
874 (1985), this Court stated, "General maxims of equity dictate that once the equitable
jurisdiction of the court has attached, the court should retain jurisdiction to resolve all portions of
the dispute between the parties and render equity to all parties." McHugh, supra, at 200, 766
P.2d at 135. This Court, citing with approval to several California cases, noted that '"tlhe courts
accord special treatment in equity actions, and that an action to divide an omitted asset in the
context of a divorce proceeding is an action in equity, and that such does not seek to modify or
reopen the previous final judgment of dissolution." Id
Debra merely requested that the magistrate court divide an omitted asset; she did not, nor
is she currently, asking any court to modify the September 22, 2005 Judgment and Decree of
Divorce. Debra's Motion to Divide Omitted Asset, by its terms, sought division of assets
(convertible notes and stock allocations) that were not included in the September 22, 2005
Judgment and Decree of Divorce, nor considered by the parties prior to executing the Property
Settlement Agreement attached thereto. Even if this Court finds that the Property Settlement
Agreement was not merged and incorporated into the parties' September 22,2005 Judgment and
Decree of Divorce, that fact alone did not eliminate the magistrate court's jurisdiction to divide
the same as omitted assets.
By definition, "omitted" means that it was not included. Importantly, the magistrate
court stated the following:
This court believes that in fact this is not an omitted asset
but rather controlled by paragraph four under the division of
retirement benefit and specifically under amounts to be received
from United Airlines.
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If however, this matter is appealed and it is determined
that in fact this is not to be considered under paragraph four
then this court would rule that in fact this was an omitted asset
and require the division as set forth above.
(R., 00039, fly 4-5.) (Emphasis added.) Thus, the magistrate court concluded that the convertible
notes fell under paragraph four of the Property Settlement agreement and should be divided as
set forth therein, or, at the very least, constituted an "omitted asset." Either way, the magistrate
court determined that this asset needed to be divided.
The underlying principle of Idaho law is that property acquired during the course of
marriage should be divided equitably between the parties pursuant to I.C.

5

32-712. Both the

magistrate court and the district court attempted to do just that. Therefore, the lower courts'
decisions concerning the division of the convertible notes should be upheld and said notes should
he divided pursuant to the "time rule" formula: number of months that Kevin and Debra were
married while Kevin was employed by United divided by the number of months that Kevin was
employed by United, multiplied by convertible notes received multiplied by one-half equals
Debra's share.
3. The Convertible Notes and the Stock Allocations Represent
Communitv Properly Assets Pursuant to Paragra~h4 of the
Properly Settlement Agreement or Omitted Assets Which Should
Be Divided.

Contrary to Kevin's position, neither the convertible notes nor the stock allocations
represent Kevin's separate property. The stipulated facts make it very clear that the convertible
notes and the stock allocations received by Kevin represented undivided community assets.
Again, the convertible notes were provided to United pilots, including Kevin, as a partial
offset to the losses suffered as a result of termination of their A Plan. (A.R., No. 10, p. 5 fl 10.)
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Moreover, in order to qualify for these convertible notes, Kevin had to have been a qualified
member of the A Plan as of December 30, 2004. (A.R., No. 10, p. 6,

1 16.)

Kevin began

7 2.)

Kevin was a

working for United as a pilot in October of 1990. (A.R., No. 10, p. 2,

qualified member of the United "A Plan" as of December 30,2004. (A.R., No. 10, p. 5, fjTl 10
and 11, and p. 6, T 16.) To be perfectly clear, the convertible notes represented an attempt by
United to appease their pilots as a result of the loss of their "A Plan." (A.R., No. 10, p. 5,77 10,
11 and 13.) This fact is further borne out by the following:
Convertible Notes. In the event that the A plan is
terminated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 5 1341 or 5 1342 following
judicial approval of such termination, the revised 2003 Pilot
Agreement and the Plan of Reorganization shall provide for the
issuance of $550 Million of UAL convertible notes as described in
Exhibit " D to this letter of agreement to a trust or other entity
designated by the Association. The terms of the UAL convertible
notes described in Exhibit "D" shall be subject to mutually
acceptable modifications to optimize implementation for all parties
from an accounting, securities law and tax law perspective.
7.

Like the convertible notes, the stock allocations also represented an attempt by United to
compensate their pilots for losses suffered as a result of restructuring. (A.R., No. 10, p. 6,T 15.)
In order for a pilot, like Kevin, to receive the stock allocations, he must have been employed on
May 1, 2003. (A.R., No. 10, p. 6,fl 14.) Kevin easily qualified for these stock allocations as his
continuing employment with United began in October of 1990. (A.R., No. 10, p. 2,

fl

2.)

Consequently, Kevin received multiple stock allocations following United's emergence from
bankruptcy in February of 2006. (A.R., No. 10, p. 5 at flT 9, 10, 1 1 and 12.) These allocations
represented compensation that Kevin lost as a result of the restructuring of his collective
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bargaining agreement, which runs from May 1, 2003 through December 31, 2009. (A.R., No.
10, p 6 , 7 15.)
Neither the 2003 Restructured Agreement, nor any subsequent letters, required United
pilots to maintain their employment after receipt of the convertible notes and/or stock allocations
in question. (A.R., No. 10, p. 7,

7

18.) In fact, pilots could immediately terminate their

employment following receipt of the convertible notes and/or stock allocations, without being
required to return any of the funds. (A.R., No. 10, p. 7,

7

18.) Although based in part on

projections of one kind or another, it is undisputed that these community assets were received by
Kevin, did not need to be returned by Kevin, were earned during the parties' marriage, and
would represent a windfall to Kevin if he is permitted to retain an undivided interest in the same.
These undivided assets need to be divided pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Property Settlement
Agreement, or divided as "omitted assets" pursuant to Debra's earlier motion.
The funds generated by the convertible notes, as well as the stock allocations, do not
represent post-divorce income. The undisputed facts in this case make it impossible for Kevin to
assert otherwise. Kevin and Debra were married while United was in bankruptcy, and while
these benefits and protections were being negotiated on Kevin's behalf as a United pilot. (A.R.,
No. 10.) As set forth in the Judgment and Decree of Divorce, the parties were not divorced until
September 22, 2005. (R., 00019.) Therefore, the convertible notes and stock allocations
represent community assets, which should have been divided via the September 22, 2005
Judgment and Decree of Divorce but were not.
Notwithstanding the above, however, Kevin asserts that the "stock allocation [he]
received is clearly income he acquired after the filing of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce on
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September 22, 2005, ..." because he "did not become the owner of the stock allocation until
February 1, 2006."

(Appellant's Brief, p. 11,

7

5.) Kevin's reliance on mere receipt is

misplaced. As the facts demonstrate, Kevin and Debra acquired the right to the convertible notes
and stock allocations on May 1, 2003 and December 30, 2004 respectively. (A.R., No. 10, p. 6,

1114, 15 and

16.) In other words, Kevin and Debra "acquired" the rights to the convertible

notes and the stock allocations many months prior to their September 22,2005 divorce.
In Batra v. Batra, 135 Idaho 388, 17 P.3d 889 (2001), the Idaho Supreme Court rejected
an argument similar to Kevin's "because it ignores a basic proposition of community property
law [that] 'income derived from a husband's or wife's efforts, labor and industry' during the
marriage is community property." Id., at 393, 17 P.3d at 894; citing Hiatt v. H i a t 94 Idaho 367,
368,487 P.2d 1121, 1121 (1971); Wood v. Wood, 124 Idaho 12,15 855 P.2d 473,476 (Ct. App.
1993). The stock allocations as well as the convertible notes, represented compensation earned
during the marriage:
7.
Convertible Notes. In the event that the A plan is
terminated pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
1341 or 5 1342 following
judicial approval of such termination, the revised 2003 Pilot
Agreement and the Plan of Reorganization shall provide for the
issuance of $550 Million of UAL convertible notes as described in
Exhibit " D to this letter of agreement to a trust or other entity
designated by the Association. The terms of the UAL convertible
notes described in Exhibit " D shall be subject to mutually
acceptable modifications to optimize implementation for all parties
from an accounting, securities law and tax law perspective.

15.
The stock distributions/stock allocations that each eligible
pilot received attempted to compensate the pilots for the work
rules, compensation, and work benefits that they lost as a result of
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restructuring their collective bargaining agreement, which is to run
from May 1,2003 through December 3 1,2009.
17.
In determining a pilot's share of the convertible note
allocations/distributions, United took into account each pilot's age,
years left to retirement (which is reached at age 60) and seniority.
United projected that the more seniority a pilot had, the greater the
projection as to the aircraft that helshe would be flying at
retirement. A pilot projected to be flying a 777 at the time of his
retirement versus a pilot that would be flying an A320 would be
entitled to a greater allocation of convertible notes assuming that
the pilots were of the same age. The one with greater seniority
would be projected to be flying a more advanced aircraft with
higher pay.

To reiterate, the parties were divorced on September 22, 2005. Kevin began to receive
the stock allocations in February of 2006, a mere five months later. The stock allocations
represented compensation for "the pilots for work rules, compensation and work benefits that
they lost as a result of restructuring their collective bargaining agreement" between May 1, 2003
and December 31, 2009. For all but five months of Kevin's employment, he was married to
Debra. Clearly, these allocations constituted community income and therefore, pursuant to

Batra, supra., the community interest in the same should be divided pursuant to the Batra
formula,
4. The District Court Did Not Err When it Reversed the Magistrate
Court on the Issue of Whether the Stock Allocations Constitutes
an Omitted Asset.

In pertinent part, the magistrate court's October 10, 2007 Memorandum Decision, states
the following:
With regards to the stock allocation, it is clear to this court
pursuant to the February 9, 2006 letter marked Exhibit "3" to
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Matthew Bohn's Affidavit of April 16, 2007, the income received
from the sale of United stock was paid to the pilots because they
gave up significant compensation pursuant to work rules, work
benefits and regular compensation to allow for United airlines to
go through and exit bankruptcy.

Regardless of the above, it is clear from Debra's deposition taken
on February 9, 2007 that she was well aware of United Airlines
offers to compensate the pilots during the bankruptcy in order to
resolve the restructuring issues facing United Airlines.
Debra specifically testified that she understood that sometime in
the future the pilots of United Airlines including Kevin could
possibly be compensated for them having their retirement taken
away and agreeing to pay cuts during the restructuring.
Debra also testified that she was specifically aware of this
possibility when she and Kevin entered into the settlement
agreement that is the subject of this litigation.
Therefore, based on the Stipulated Facts and the deposition of
Debra and United Airlines documents reviewed by this court, it is
clear that the stock allocation would fall under paragraph 13 of the
Property Settlement Agreement and would be Kevin's sole and
separate property.
( R . 00039-00040.)

Incorrectly, the magistrate court failed to recognize Debra's

undisputed/uncontroverted testimony that the stock allocations were not included in the Property

Settlement Agreement because Debra was "emotionally distraught" due to Kevin's
unfaithfulness. (A.R., No. 10, p. 7,

7 21, and A.R.,

No. 16, Exh. 5 (Deposition of Debra A.

Borley, taken February 9,2007, p. 19, L1. 13-25, p. 20, L1. 1-2).)
Further, it is also uncontroverted that Kevin did not raise any issues or volunteer any
information about the convertible notes andor stock allocations that he would be receiving in the
near future at the time the parties executed the Property Settlement Agreement. (A.R., No. 10, p.
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7, 721, and A.R., No. 16, Exh. 5 (Deposition of Debra A. Borley, taken February 9,2007, p. 19,

The mere fact that Debra knew at one point in time that Kevin would be receiving "stock
allocations" at some point in the future, does not prevent the magistrate court from dividing the
same as an omitted asset at a later date.
As the district court correctly pointed out:
An examination of the stipulated facts reveals that the stock
ailocations were meant to compensate United Airlines' pilots for
"the work rules, compensation, and work benefits that they lost as
a result of restructuring their collective bargaining agreement,
which is to run from May 1, 2003 through December 31, 2009."
Presumably, a portion of the stock ailocations received by Smith
represented the loss of work rules, compensation, and work
benefits suffered between May 1,2003 and the date of the divorce.
This portion is clearly community property not covered by the
terms of the settlement agreement. As such, it is an omitted asset
and must be divided equitably between the parties.
Furthermore, Idaho courts have rejected Smith's argument
that since vesting of the stock allocations was contingent upon his
continued employment through February 1, 2006, the allocations
constituted separate property. Batra, 135 Idaho at 393 17 P.3d at
894 (finding that stock options which vested after date of divorce
were partially eamed from the piaintiff-appellant's labor during
marriage and, thus, the community had a fractional interest in the
stock options vesting in the months following the divorce).
(R., 00064-00065.) At the very least, the district court recognized that the stock allocations
represented a loss resulting from a change in work rules, compensation and benefits suffered by
United pilots, including Kevin, between May 1, 2003 and the date of the parties' divorce,
September 22,2005. (R., 00064-00065.)
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In 1994, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that "Most jurisdictions hold that if a final
decree of divorce fails to dispose of community property, the former spouses own the omitted
property equally as tenants in common." Clark v Clark, 125 Idaho 173, 175,868 P.2d 501,503
(Ct.App. 1994). The Court of Appeals further noted that "It is not strictly accurate to define this
ownership after divorce by common-law terms, such as tenancy in common, ... it is rather a form
of joint ownership, peculiar to the civil law community property system."

Id. (citing

DeFUNIAK, Principles of Community Property 5 229 (2d ed. 1971)).
This Court has held that "It is well established that without an appeal from an original
decree of divorce the property division portions of that decree are final, res judicata, and no
jurisdiction exists to modify property provisions of a divorce decree." Ratkowski v. Ratkowski,
115 Idaho 692, 693, 769 P.2d 569, 570 (1989). However, this Court further explained that it is
not a modification of a divorce decree when the court is enforcing the terms of its own decree.
See Id at 694, 769 P.2d at 571. In support of its finding that a court has continuing jurisdiction
to enforce its orders, this Court stated:
This general principle is codified in Idaho Code
provides:

5

1-1622, which

Incidental Means to Exercise Jurisdiction. - When
jurisdiction is, by this code, or by any other statute,
conferred on a court or judicial officer all the means
necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and
in exercise of the jurisdiction if the course of
proceedings be not specifically pointed out by this
code, or the statute, any suitable process or mode of
proceeding may be adopted which may appear most
conformable to the spirit of this code.
The nature of continuing jurisdiction was outlined in McDonald v
McDonald, 55 Idaho 102, 114,39 P.2d 293,298 (1934):
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The court having jurisdiction of both the subject
matter and person of the defendants, has the right
and authority to hear and determine all questions
that occur in the case and are essential to a decision
of the merits of the issues, and it likewise has
authority and jurisdiction to make such orders and
issues such writs as may be necessary and essential
to carry the decree into effect and render it binding
and operative.

Ratkowski, supra at 694,769, P.2d at 571
As the above-cited case law sets forth, and most particularly Ratkowski, supra, holds, the
magistrate court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce the September 22, 2005 Decree to carry
out the Decree's division of the property in question. The mere fact that Debra forgot to include
the convertible notes and/or the stock allocations in the Property Settlement Agreement should
not prevent the lower court from dividing the omitted asset. Kevin should not receive a windfall
as a result of his intentional failure to raise the stock allocations issue, at worst, or receive a
windfall because he forgot, like Debra, to include the stock allocation in the Property Settlement
Agreement, at best. Again, by definition, "omitted" means that the asset was not included. The
district court properly reversed the magistrate court with respect to the stock allocations.

5. Issue on Cross-Appeal -Attornev Fees
On November 20, 2007, the magistrate court entered an order granting in part and
denying in part Plaintiffs Motion to Divide an Omitted Asset, and on September 10, 2008, the
district court entered its Decision on Appeal. Both the magistrate court and the district court
concluded that Debra owned an interest in the convertible notes and/or stock allocations. Prior to
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the lower courts' respective rulings, Debra did not have a recognized interest in either. For this
reason, Debra should be considered the prevailing party.
Paragraph 15.03 of the Property Settlement Agreement, cited above, states that the
prevailing party is entitled to all costs and attorney fees incurred in bringing an action:
15.03 If an action is instituted to enforce any of the terms of this
Agreement, then the losing party agrees to pay to the prevailing
&all costs and attorneys' fees incurred in that action.

(R., 00025.) (emphasis added).
It is clear that Debra had to file the Motion to Divide Omitted Asset andlor seek
enforcement of the Property Settlement Agreement, since Kevin refused to agree to a division of
the convertible notes and/or stock allocations. In the event this Court affirms the district court
and/or the magistrate court, Debra should be the prevailing party as defined by paragraph 15.03
of the parties' Property Settlement Agreement.
A settlement agreement that is merged and incorporated into a decree of divorce that
provides for the award of attorney fees "is valid and enforceable as such." Noble v. Fisher, 126
Idaho 885, 891, 894 P.2d 118, 124 (1995). As this Court held in that case, "the clear and
unambiguous import of [the attorney fee] provision is that if the parties subsequently dispute the
terms of the settlement agreement--their applicability, modifiability, enforceability, or meaning-then the party who prevails in the dispute is entitled to have his or her attorney fees paid by the
losing party." Id, at 892,894 P.2d at 125.
As with the Property Settlement Agreement executed by the parties in this instant matter,
the attorney fee provision in the Noble case provided that "if any action is instituted under the
terms of this agreement, then the losing party agrees to pay the prevailing party his or her costs
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and reasonable attorney fees.. .." Id. at 891, 894 P.2d at 124. This Court affirmed the magistrate
court's award of attorney fees to the wife pursuant to the parties' settlement agreement, even
though it had not granted her requests for an award of attorney fees pursuant to either Idaho
Code § 12-121 or Idaho Code 4 32-704. Similarly, this Court should award Debra her attorney
fees pursuant to the parties' stipulated enforceable agreement that attorney fees be awarded to the
prevailing party set forth in Paragraph 15.03 of the Property Settlement Agreement.

v.
CONCLUSION
The magistrate court and the district court properly concluded that the convertible notes
represented community property that should be divided by Paragraph 4 of the Property
Settlement Agreement, or, in the alternative, represented an omitted asset that should be divided
pursuant to the time rule method. The district court also properly reversed the magistrate court
by finding that the stock allocations represented omitted assets that should have been divided.
Based on the above, Debra respectfully requests that this Court affirm the decision of the district
court with respect to the convertible notes and the stock allocations.
Debra also respectfully requests that this Court reverse both the magistrate court and the
district court with respect to her request for attorney fees and costs pursuant to paragraph 15.03
of the Property Settlement Agreement.
Finally, Debra requests that she be awarded all of her attorney fees on appeal pursuant to
Idaho Appellate Rules 35(a)(5), 40, 41 and paragraph 15.03 of the Property Settlement
Agreement.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5thday of May, 2009.
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